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Ukraine and Russia: 
a hindered rapprochement
Sławomir Matuszak 
Co-operation: Anna Górska
The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych 
and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his 
presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered 
pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres 
in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numero-
us top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in 
energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached 
in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and 
where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions 
possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October 
session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime 
ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and 
on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted 
from prior agreements.
Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the obse-
rved deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these 
talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well 
as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt 
for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour.
Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline 
shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they con-
sider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s 
adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a co-
oling in bilateral relations.
1. Previous agreements
Since the presidential elections in February 2010, the Ukrainian government has concluded 
a number of agreements that met Russia’s expectations, starting with the ‚fleet for gas’ agre-
ement. Ukraine agreed to extend the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea for 
25 years, i.e. until 2042, in return for a 30-percent discount on the high price of Russian 
gas, included in the gas contract signed by the previous government. This discount will be 
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calculated as a reduction in Ukraine’s debt (from 2017, this debt will be go down in line with 
Russia’s successive payments for stationing the fleet).
The ‚fleet for gas’ deal has provided the Ukrainian government with short-term benefits. 
It saves Ukraine some $4 billion a year (provided that gas prices are kept at current levels). 
A lower gas price enabled the adoption of a budget with a deficit of less than 6%, which 
in turn enabled the resumption of cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and 
improved the condition of Ukraine’s chemical and metallurgical industries. The extension of 
the stationing of the fleet has also reduced tension in Crimea and decreased the popularity 
of pro-Russian parties in this region. Nevertheless, this deal can hardly be considered as 
a success for Ukraine since certain unfavourable provisions in the gas contract have not 
been lifted. First of all, the price formula has not been changed which means that Ukraine 
will continue to pay relatively high rates. Also, except for 2010, the volume of gas contracted 
remains unchanged (52 billion m3, with the possibility to reduce it by 20%) with Ukraine not al-
lowed to re-export the excess gas. Ukraine 
will hardly be able to use so much gas, mo-
reover, this will impede its attempts to intro-
duce energy-saving technologies (Ukraine’s 
is one of the most energy-intensive econo-
mies in the world). Kyiv has also failed to 
make Russia guarantee a specific volume of 
gas transferred via Ukrainian territory and 
to include it in the contract.
Kyiv’s concessions resulted from decisions made by the previous government who signed 
an 11-year gas contract that was unfavourable to Ukraine; it did so under international pres-
sure when gas supplies to Ukraine were withheld in January 2009 as a result of the‚ gas 
war’. It seems that regardless of who would become president in 2010, this contract would 
have needed to be renegotiated. The Party of Regions considers the ‚discount for the further 
stationing of Black Sea Fleet’ deal the lowest price Ukraine could pay, and the withdrawal 
of the fleet in 2017 was, furthermore, widely regarded as unrealistic.
So far, Ukraine and Russia have fortified their cooperation in two spheres of the economy: 
nuclear energy and the aircraft industry. In the first case, Ukraine has accepted Russia’s 
monopoly on nuclear fuel supplies and the modernisation of power plants. In the second 
case, major Ukrainian aircraft factories were merged with Russian ones to form a Russian-
Ukrainian joint venture.
The agreement between Ukraine’s Antonov State Aeronautic Concern and Russia’s United 
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) to establish a joint venture means that the Ukrainian corporation 
will be merged with a part of OAK. Both sides saw the merger as advantageous, but its im-
portance is much greater for Ukraine. The merger will revive the Ukrainian aircraft industry 
and increase its profitability; currently this industry is in crisis as the market for its produc-
tion has shrunk and funding for production has been insufficient. Antonov tried in vain to 
enter the EU and US markets, but they preferred to support their domestic aircraft corpo-
rations. In July 2010, Antonov participated in a tender organised by the US Department of 
Defence concerning the supplies of air tankers, but its application was rejected for formal 
reasons. Given this situation, a merger with a Russian corporation was their only chance 
to survive. Cooperation with Russia will help Antonov to win contracts in the Russian mar-
ket and in third markets, and will allow it to resume the serial production of such aircraft 
as An-124 Ruslan and An-225 Mriya, and to increase the sales of An-140 and An-70.
The Party of Regions considers the 
'discount for the further stationing of 
Black Sea Fleet’ deal the lowest price 
Ukraine could pay. Furthermore, 
the withdrawal of the fleet in 2017 
was widely regarded as unrealistic.
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In June 2010, an intergovernmental agreement was signed to complete the construction 
of two reactors at the nuclear power plant in Khmelnitsky, for which Russia provided 
a low-interest loan of $2 billion, and an agreement on the supplies of nuclear fuel. More-
over, in October the Ukrainian State Company ‚Nuclear Fuel’ and Russia’s TVEL concluded 
an agreement providing that Russians would construct a plant producing nuclear fuel on 
Ukrainian territory. The agreement states that Ukraine will hold a controlling stake in this 
plant. It cannot be ruled out that this investment will be delayed as it is not favourable for 
TVEL (the Russian corporation currently has a total monopoly on supplies to Ukraine). 
The deals signed mean that Ukraine has given up its plans to diversify supplies and has 
become fully dependent on Russian nuclear fuel. Earlier Ukraine had held talks with Ame-
rica’s Westinghouse corporation on the supplies of fuel, but Russia warned that it would 
withdraw its security guarantees for Soviet and Russian reactors if fuel from other sources 
was used there. However, Russia has so far failed to achieve its main goal, i.e. to establish 
a joint nuclear corporation that would group machinery plants, production and sales of ener-
gy from nuclear power plants, uranium mining and the production of nuclear fuel (should 
that happen, it would give Russia total control over the Ukrainian nuclear sector). As such, 
Ukraine’s decision to give up its search for diversification of fuel supplies brings it some 
profits (American fuel would have been more expensive) and does not affect the interests 
of Ukrainian big business. What Ukraine clearly wants to avoid is completely losing control 
over the nuclear energy area, especially by allowing Russia to engage in electricity sales.
2. Key sticking points
Extensive bilateral economic negotiations have been ongoing simultaneously since spring 
2010, both on a government level and on the level of individual companies. The talks 
concerned different sectors of the economy, above all the energy sector. Information on 
these negotiations has been very scarce. Moreover, messages coming from the two sides 
are often contradictory, which makes it hard to assess how advanced the talks are and 
what their result may be. A number of issues are being discussed simultaneously, so there 
may be agreements wherein one partner’s concessions in one sector are compensated by 
benefits in other areas. 
2.1. Gas issues
Despite the discount received in April 2010, Ukraine is still paying a relatively high price for 
gas ($252 for 1,000 m3 in the 4th quarter of 2010; by comparison, Belarus pays $194). 
Among those who are most interested in a reduction in the gas price there are represen-
tatives of a group in the Party of Regions associated with the oligarch Dmytro Firtash, 
the co-owner of RosUkrEnergo (minister 
of energy Yuri Boyko and head of the Pre-
sidential Administration Serhiy Lovochkin 
belong to this group). Firtash’s activity is 
concentrated in the gas sector and che-
mical industry (where natural gas is used 
as a resource). He is vitally interested 
in a further reduction of the gas price. 
His group has significantly strengthened 
its position following Yanukovych’s elec-
tion, and its representatives opt for closer 
cooperation with Russia.
It is completely unlikely that Ukraine 
will agree to merge Naftohaz 
with Gazprom, as was suggested 
by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
in May 2010. A solution preferable 
to Kyiv would be to establish a tripartite 
consortium (the EU, Ukraine 
and Russia) that would manage 
the pipelines but not own them.
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In its negotiations with Russia, the government is seeking to reduce the gas price by renego-
tiating the price formula that Ukraine deems unfavourable and by getting access to Russian 
gas deposits. Another objective is to maintain Ukraine’s position as the main transit country 
for Russian gas and to guarantee that the current level of transit is sustained (for Russia this 
would have to mean giving up its plans to construct the South Stream pipeline). A further 
objective Ukraine has is to get assistance in the modernisation of its pipeline system, pre-
ferably with the participation of the EU.
Russia for its part is seeking to take over control of the pipeline system, to strengthen 
its position on the Ukrainian gas market and to participate in gas extraction in Ukraine. 
Control over pipelines could be acquired by merging Naftohaz with Gazprom or by establi-
shing a joint venture that would own the Ukrainian pipeline system. However, it is comple-
tely unlikely that Ukraine will agree to merge Naftohaz with Gazprom, as was suggested by 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in May 2010. A solution preferable to Kyiv would be to esta-
blish a tripartite consortium (the EU, Ukraine and Russia) that would manage the pipelines 
but not own them. What is also possible is the establishment of a joint venture of Naftohaz 
and Gazprom that would deal with the extraction and sales of gas on the Ukrainian market 
and would modernise the pipelines. Russia suggested that the joint venture could receive 
some gas deposits located in the Yamal Peninsula and in the region of Astrakhan, which 
attracted Ukraine’s interest. For Russia, the creation of a joint venture, even though consi-
dered a half-solution, would still enable it to strengthen its position on the Ukrainian market 
and to gradually take over some assets.
In October 2010 it was announced that the gas contract would be signed by July 2011, 
which suggests that neither side envisages reaching a prompt agreement. Ukraine is se-
eking to reduce the gas price, although this need is no longer urgent, as the industry proved 
able to operate even when paying current rates. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the 
representatives of Ukrainian business who opt for closer cooperation with Russia will suc-
ceed in pushing through a decision that will reduce the gas price and give them a share in 
gas export revenue in return for establishing a joint venture.
2.2. Oil transit
By late November 2010, Ukraine and Russia had signed the intergovernmental agreement on the 
transit of oil in 2011, wherein Russia has pledged to send 17 million tonnes of oil via Ukrainian 
territory. However, according to the information available (the contract has not been made public), 
no sanctions are provided should Russia fail 
to comply with these terms. This in fact me-
ans that the current principles of transit will 
be sustained. It can be regarded as a defeat 
for Ukraine, since its declared objective was 
to sign a 5-year transit agreement that wo-
uld define a minimum volume of oil transfer-
red. Current principles (no minimal volumes 
guaranteed) are good for Russia, as it plans 
to activate the first branch of the BTS-2 oil pipeline in 2011, which will allow it to diversify its 
oil supplies to Europe, e.g. by sea from the Ust-Luga port on the Baltic Sea.
However, Moscow gave up its earlier plans to block the use of the Odessa-Brody pipeline in 
the direction of Brody (the contract initialled in October had provided that Russians would 
continue to use the pipeline). Russia had used the pipeline to send only small amounts of 
oil and completely stopped transit in November 2010, probably due to shortages of oil. 
Ukraine's important objective is 
to get profits from transit fees. 
When Russia proved unable 
to provide the appropriate volumes 
of transit, Kyiv did not hesitate 
to look for other partners.
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While negotiating with Russia, Kyiv simultaneously held talks with Belarus concerning the 
use of this pipeline (Belarus was searching for oil supplies alternative to Russian). Not ha-
ving reached any agreement with Russia, Ukraine chose to use the pipeline to send oil to 
Belarus. On 1 November a ministerial agreement between Ukraine and Belarus was signed, 
providing that in 2011 8 million tons of oil would be transmitted from the port of Odessa to 
the Mazyr refinery along the Odessa-Brody pipeline and the southern branch of the Druzhba 
pipeline. Reversing the Odessa-Brody pipeline in the Belarusian direction will be a proof 
that Kyiv is ready to participate in projects that undermine Russia’s interests. Ukraine’s im-
portant objective is to get profits from transit fees. When Russia proved unable to provide 
the appropriate volumes of transit, Kyiv did not hesitate to look for other partners.
2.3. Cooperation in the electric energy sector
During the October session of the intergovernmental committee, Ukraine and Russia set-
tled that an agreement on the parallel operation of the electric energy systems of the two 
countries would be prepared by the end of the year. This declaration meets Russia’s needs. 
Up till now, Ukraine has expressed interest in linking the systems to exchange energy in ca-
ses of increased demand, but it consistently opposed Russian energy being exported via its 
networks, as Kyiv itself has significant exporting potential in this branch (according to some 
estimates, Ukraine uses only half of its production capacity). By signing the agreement 
with Russia, Ukraine would contradict 
the commitments it took when joining the 
Energy Community. One of the commit-
ments was to unite its energy network with 
the European UCTE system (the Union 
for the Coordination of Transmission of 
Electricity) which would enable Ukrainian 
electric energy to be exported to the EU. 
If the Ukrainian and Russian networks are linked, the main exporter will be Russia which 
produces cheaper energy, and Ukraine’s role will amount to its being a transit country.
The agreement as proposed by Russia would in fact prevent Ukraine from exporting its 
electric energy to the EU, therefore it seems that Ukraine would conclude this agreement 
only if Russia makes serious concessions in other areas, especially in connection with gas. 
If Ukraine agrees to do so, it would seriously affect Ukraine’s richest businessman Rinat 
Akhmetov, associated with the Party of Regions, who has made large investments in the 
electric energy sector and is vitally interested in exporting energy to the West. On the other 
hand, this solution may be lobbied for by the Firtash group which is competing with the 
Akhmetov faction and is seeking to weaken the latter’s position.
3. Hindered rapprochement
Despite numerous top-level bilateral meetings conducted in recent months, the results of 
the talks proved to be unimpressive, as illustrated by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s last 
visit to Kyiv in late October. During this visit, Russia and Ukraine did sign two important 
economic agreements, but the decision to do so had been made back in the summer. 
No agreement was reached in the area of gas, contrary to earlier announcements. Moreover, 
the atmosphere of Putin’s visit was clearly less favourable than during previous meetings. 
Equally unproductive was the session of the interstate commission on 26 November with 
the participation of Presidents Yanukovych and Medvedev. An agreement on oil transport was si-
gned, which did not take into account Ukraine’s demands, but no progress was made in gas talks.
If the Ukrainian and Russian ne-
tworks are linked, the main exporter 
will be Russia which produces che-
aper energy, and Ukraine's role will 
amount to its being a transit country.
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One of the greatest obstacles in negotiating with Moscow are the concerns Ukrainian oli-
garchs have that Russian businesses would expand in the branches they consider their 
exclusive domains. Moreover, the government is unwilling to make concessions without 
being certain that it will receive adequate compensation. Finally, a gradual improvement 
of Ukraine’s economic situation allows Kyiv to be more assertive in its talks with Moscow, 
which has led to an apparent slow-down in negotiations.
The government in Kyiv firmly supports the businesses of Ukrainian oligarchs whenever they 
compete with Russians. For example, Russia’s attempt to take over Ukraine’s largest me-
tallurgical plant, Ilyich, in Mariupol was blocked by Mykola Azarov’s government, because 
Rinat Akhmetov was also interested in acquiring the plant. Similarly, Kyiv Commercial Court 
overruled the purchase of the Luhansk Locomotive-Building Factory by Russia’s Bryansk 
Engineering Plant.
4. Conclusions
The slowdown in Russian-Ukrainian economic negotiations shows that the government 
in Kyiv has become extremely cautious about the presence of Russian business in Ukraine. 
Whenever the interests of business groups associated with the Party of Regions and Russian 
interests clash, Ukraine does not hesitate to oppose Moscow.
The scope and details of possible bilateral agreements now seem difficult to predict. 
It seems, however, that any agreement that would be harmful to certain sectors of the 
Ukrainian economy would only be possible if counterbalanced by Russia’s concessions 
in other areas. Existing agreements (such 
as the contract on the transit of oil) show 
that Russia is not ready to make such con-
cessions. There is a possibility that the gro-
ups in Ukraine (mainly in the gas sector) 
who opt for closer cooperation with Russia 
may successfully lobby for some conces-
sions to Russia.
Existing economic agreements (with the 
exception of the‚ fleet for gas’ contract that 
was concluded under time pressure) can-
not be considered as harmful for Ukraine. 
Cooperation with Russia is often a cheaper and a more beneficial option (as in the case of nuclear 
fuel supplies) if not the only one possible (aircraft industry). However, this closer cooperation does 
strengthen Russia’s position in Ukraine, which can (and will) be used by Moscow in the future.
At the moment, the greatest importance is attached to negotiations in the energy sphere, 
including the gas sector and cooperation in the area of electric energy. Considering how diver-
gent the interests of the two parties are, prompt agreement should not be expected.
The slowdown in Russian-Ukrainian 
economic negotiations shows that the 
government in Kyiv has become extre-
mely cautious about the presence of 
Russian business in Ukraine. Whene-
ver the interests of business groups 
associated with the Party of Regions 
and Russian interests clash, Ukraine 
does not hesitate to oppose Moscow.
